Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

Scott A. Lunceford and Deborah Lunceford Harker
v. Mona Vincent Lunceford and M. Daylee Jeffs as
trustee of the Clyde M. Lunceford Trust : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Benson L. Hathaway, Jr.; Thomas A. Mecham; Kirton & McConkie; Counsel for Appellees.
Jeffrey W. Shields; Andrew H. Stone; Ryan M. Harris; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Lunceford v. Lunceford, No. 20050027 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5505

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SCOTT A. LUNCEFORD and DEBORAH
LUNCEFORD HARKER,
CaseNo.20050027-CA

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.

District Court Case No. 030404549

MONA VINCENT LUNCEFORD, an
individual; and M. DAYLE JEFFS, in his
capacity as Trustee of the Clyde M.
Lunceford Trust,
Defendants/Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS AND DEREK PULLAN

Benson L. Hathaway, Jr.
Thomas A. Mecham
KIRTON & McCONKJE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

Jeffrey W. Shields (USB #2948)
Andrew H. Stone (USB #4921)
Ryan M. Harris (USB #8192)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1644
Telephone: (801) 521-3200

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

Counselfor Plaintiffs/Appellants

720415vl

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 0 7 2005

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SCOTT A. LUNCEFORD and DEBORAH
LUNCEFORD HARKER,
CaseNo.20050027-CA

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.

District Court Case No. 030404549

MONA VINCENT LUNCEFORD, an
individual; and M. DAYLE JEFFS, in his
capacity as Trustee of the Clyde M.
Lunceford Trust,
Defendants/Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS AND DEREK PULLAN

Benson L. Hathaway, Jr.
Thomas A. Mecham
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

Jeffrey W. Shields (USB #2948)
Andrew H. Stone (USB #4921)
Ryan M. Harris (USB #8192)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1644
Telephone: (801) 521-3200

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

Counselfor Plaintiffs/Appellants

720415vl

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

ARGUMENT

1

I.

II.

720415vl

THE SCOPE OF APPELLANTS' APPEAL

1

A.

Appellants Have Appealed the District Court's Decision to Deny the
Motion to Reconsider
1

B.

Appellants Have Not Waived Issues Raised in Their Complaint, But Not
Germane to this Appeal or Decided by the District Court, By Not Raising
Them in the Appeal
2

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CAN BE UNAMBIGUOUSLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST APPELLANTS
4
A.

Basic Rules of Contractual Interpretation

4

B.

Without Considering "All Relevant Evidence/' the District Court Made
the Determination—On a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion—That the Settlement
Agreement Is Unambiguous
8

C.

The Jeffs Affidavit Is Admissible and Competent Evidence

D.

The District Court's Determination that the Settlement Agreement Is
Unambiguous in Mona's Favor Was Erroneous
13

11

1.

Even without consideration of the Jeffs Affidavit, Appellants'
interpretation is tenable and reasonable, while Mona's proffered
interpretation is not
14

2.

Consideration of "all relevant evidence," including the
Jeffs Affidavit, cements Appellants' interpretations as the
correct one
-h-

17

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES TO
MONA
19

CONCLUSION

20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

21

720415vl

-iii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Flying J. Inc. v. Comdata Network. Inc..
405 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2005),
petition for cert, filed. 74 USLW 3303 (Oct. 31,2005) (No. 05-582)
In re Eric Peterson Constr..
951 F.2d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 1991)

5, 6, 8

3

Singleton v. Wulff.
428 U.S. 106 (1976)

3
STATE CASES

Coleman v. Utah State Land Bd..
795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990)
C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners.
817 P.2d 238 (N.M. 1991)

11
6

Gillmor v. Macey.
2005 UTApp 351, 121 P.3d 57

7

Mackey v. Cannon.
2000 UT App 36, 996 P.2d 1081

11

Nielsen v. Gold's Gym.
2003 UT 37, 78 P.3d 600

7

Novell. Inc. v. The Canopy Group. Inc..
2004 UT App 162, 92 P.3d 768

7

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Dravage & Rigging Co..
442P.2d641 (Cal. 1968)

6

Peterson v. Sunrider Corp..
2002 UT 43,48 P.3d 918

720415vl

7,9

-iv-

Rentmeister v. DeSilva.
553 P.2d411 (Utah 1976)

12

United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Midvale Home Fin. Corp..
46 P.2d 672 (Utah 1935)
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n.
907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995)

3

passim

Webb v. Webb.
209P.2d201 (Utah 1949)

11

WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp..
2002 UT 88, 54 P.3d 1139

5

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
UtahR. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

passim
OTHER AUTHORITIES

5 Corbin on Contracts § 24.7 (1998)

720415vl

6

-V-

ARGUMENT
I.

THE SCOPE OF APPELLANTS' APPEAL
Appellee Mona Vincent Lunceford ("Mona") makes two arguments related to the

scope of Appellants' appeal that need to be addressed at the outset.
A.

Appellants Have Appealed the District Court's Decision to Deny the
Motion to Reconsider

First, Mona argues that "Appellants failed to argue in their opening brief that the
district court abused its discretion in denying their motion to reconsider, and therefore that
issue is waived on appeal." See Mona's Br., at 1. This is simply not the case. On the very
first page of Appellants' opening brief, Appellants set forth as "Appellate Issue No. 2" the
following issue: "Whether the district court erred in refusing to reconsider its ruling granting
Mona's Motion to Dismiss." See Aplt. Br., at 1. Appellants pointed out that the standard of
review on this issue was "abuse of discretion" (which differed from the de novo standard on
the related "Appellate Issue No. 1," which was whether the district court erred in granting the
Motion to Dismiss in the first place). Mona chides Appellants for not restating Appellate
Issue No. 2 explicitly in other places in their brief, but Appellants are unaware of a
requirement that an issue, to be preserved on appeal, must be mentioned more than once in
an appellate brief.
In fact, the manner in which Appellants structured their brief was perfectly rational,
and does not result in the waiver of any issue. Heading I in Appellants' brief was an
argument that the "district court erred in determining that the Settlement Agreement can be
unambiguously construed against Appellants." This argument goes to both Appellate Issue
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No. 1 (whether the court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss, an issue that receives de
novo review) and to Appellate Issue No. 2 (whether the court properly denied the Motion to
Reconsider, an issue that draws review for abuse of discretion). Indeed, part of Appellants'
argument centers around the Jeffs Affidavit (as opposed to Jeffs' letters or potential live
testimony at the hearing), which did not even exist until the Motion to Reconsider. In their
argument in their opening brief, Appellants point out the reasons why the district court erred
in determining that the Settlement Agreement could be unambiguously construed against
them, regardless of whether the standard of review is de novo or abuse of discretion. The
mere fact that Appellants did not re-state the appellate issues and the appellate standards of
review in their argument section, after already having stated them once, does not and cannot
result in a waiver of any argument.
B.

Appellants Have Not Waived Issues Raised in Their Complaint,, But Not
Germane to this Appeal or Decided by the District Court, By Not Raising
Them in the Appeal

Next, Mona asserts that Appellants have waived certain issues raised in their original
Complaint by not including them in their appeal. However, the issues Mona points to are not
germane to this appeal and were not decided by the district court. For instance, Mona claims
that Appellants have waived issues raised in their Complaint regarding (1) who is the proper
successor Trustee of the Trust, (2) whether the three 2001 documents that Mona produced
only after Clyde was dead are authentic or are forgeries, (3) whether Mona has improperly
used rental income, and (4) whether Appellants are entitled to damages from Mona. See
Mona's Br., at 16. This argument misperceives both the scope of this appeal as well as the
scope of the district court's decision below.
720415vl
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As Mona acknowledges, Appellants raised a host of issues in their Complaint,
including the four mentioned above, and sought broad-ranging relief against Mona for her
actions in relation to the Trust. See R. at 001-039. On Mona's motion, the district court
dismissed Appellants' entire complaint on Rule 12(b)(6), because it determined that the
Settlement Agreement was unambiguous and that, therein, Appellants waived any claims they
might have regarding the Trust. See id. at 182-191. The district court did not make any
determinations, findings, rulings, or decisions regarding the merits of the four issues set forth
in the preceding paragraph; rather, the sole ground for the district court's dismissal of the
Complaint was that it determined that Appellants had waived their claims. Id. at 183.
One can appeal only what is actually decided by the district court, because appellate
courts sit to review actual decisions of district courts. See, e.g.. In re Eric Peterson Constr..
951 F.2d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Singleton v. Wulff. 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976),
and stating that "[i]t is the general rule that a federal appellate court does not consider an
issue not passed upon below"); see also United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Midvale Home
Fin. Corp.. 46 P.2d 672,673 (Utah 1935) (stating that "[w]e may not determine questions...
not heard or determined by the trial court"). In view of this, Appellants' appeal rightly brings
only those issues decided by the district court—whether the court was correct in determining
that the Settlement Agreement unambiguously provides that Appellants waived their
claims—to the attention of this Court on appeal. Indeed, it would have been improper for
Appellants to have attempted to brief the other issues raised in the Complaint and not decided
by the district court; in fact, Appellants suspect that if they had done so, Mona would be
claiming that Appellants could not raise the issues because they had not been decided below.
720415vl
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Thus, the only issues properly presented to this Court on appeal are the ones that the
district court actually decided. Appellants certainly have not waived any of their other
arguments—not decided by the district court—by not including them in this appeal. If this
Court agrees with Appellants that their claims were not waived, and reverses the district
court's decision and remands the case for further proceedings, the result will be that
Appellants' Complaint is reinstated in its entirety, regardless of whether Appellants raised
in this appeal every issue raised in their Complaint.
IL

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CAN BE UNAMBIGUOUSLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST APPELLANTS
Turning to the merits of the appeal, the district court made two fundamental and

reversible errors in this case, regardless of the standard of review used to examine those
errors. The district court erred by, first, making the threshold determination that the
Settlement Agreement is unambiguous without even considering relevant proffered evidence
regarding the parties' intentions at the time of contracting, and, second, then proceeding to
interpret that Agreement against Appellants as a matter of law in the context of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion.

Because both parties espouse differing yet apparently tenable

interpretations of the Settlement Agreement's provisions, that Agreement is by definition
ambiguous, and the district court's decision to ignore Appellants' interpretation of the
Agreement, especially where that interpretation was supported by Appellants' allegations in
the Petition and by the Jeffs Affidavit, was erroneous and must be reversed.
A.

Basic Rules of Contractual Interpretation

In their initial brief, Appellants laid out the Utah Supreme Court's rules for
720415vl

"4-

interpreting contracts: in a nutshell, that the touchstone of contractual interpretation is giving
effect to the parties' intent, and a court may not limit its review of a document to its four
corners, even if the court believes the document to be unambiguous, because the court's
reading of the document may not be the one intended by the parties. The court must consider
"any relevant evidence" offered by the parties bearing on the meaning of the document. Only
if the court believes, after viewing and considering all relevant evidence, that the document
is and remains unambiguous, may the court proceed to interpret the document as a matter of
law on a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 motion. See Aplt. Br., at 18-23 (citing cases).
Mona takes issue with Appellants' recitation of the rules of contractual interpretation,
claiming that "Appellants' view . . . is hopelessly circular and impractical; whatever else,
Utah law can't mean that." See Mona's Br., at 24. In support of her criticisms, Mona cites
to a recent Tenth Circuit opinion in which Judge McConnell remarks that, in his view, "Utah
law is unsettled on the issue." See Flying J. Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc.. 405 F.3d 821,
831 (10th Cir. 2005), petition for cert, filed. 74 USLW 3303 (Oct. 31, 2005) (No. 05-582).
Judge McConnell's conclusions are based on contrasting cases (such as Ward v.
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995)) that actually and squarely
confronted the issue with other cases (such as WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp..
2002 UT 88,54 P.3d 1139) that did not squarely confront the issue but rather contain passing
references to pre-Ward case law. And in any event, Judge McConnell's non-binding views
are, in the end, dicta, because he did not have to squarely confront the issue either in order
to reach his decision in the case, in part because "both parties [in the Flying J case]
follow[ed] the expansive view" and believed that settled Utah law required courts to look
720415vl
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beyond the four corners of a document in making threshold determinations regarding
ambiguity. See Flying J. 405 F.3d at 831.
In reality, the Flying J litigants (and not Judge McConnell) had the right answer. Utah
law is not "unsettled" on the issue. The Utah Supreme Court squarely confronted this
controversial issue, and squarely decided it in favor of the expansive view:
When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence
must be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently
one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the 'extrinsic evidence of the judge's
own linguistic education and experience.' Although the terms of an instrument
may seem clear to a particular reader—including a judge—this does not rule
out the possibility that the parties chose the language of the agreement to
express a different meaning. A judge should therefore consider any credible
evidence offered to show the parties9 intention.
See Ward. 907 P.2d at 268 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In reaching its conclusion,
the Ward court cited favorably to other cases around the country that had effectively
abolished the "plain meaning rule," see id. (citing to, inter alia, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
G.W. Thomas Dravage & Rigging Co.. 442 P.2d 641,644 (Cal. 1968), and C.R. Anthony Co.
v. Loretto Mall Partners. 817 P.2d 23 8,242-43 (N.M. 1991)), and cited favorably to Professor
Corbin's treatise, see id., which itself speaks favorably of the "trend toward abolishing the
plain meaning rule" and cites G.W. Thomas and C.R. Anthony as having done just that, see
5 Corbin on Contracts §24.7, at 39,41,48 (1998). In short, the Utah Supreme Court in Ward
knew exactly what it was doing, and knew that its holding represented a departure from
earlier case law. Indeed, the Ward court expressly adverted to the existence of contrary case
law, and stated that:
While there is Utah case law that espouses a stricter application of the rule and
would restrict a determination of whether ambiguity exists to a judge's
720415vl
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determination of the meaning of the terms of the writing itself, the betterreasoned approach is to consider the writing in light of the surrounding
circumstances.
See Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (emphasis added). The decision in Ward drew two spirited
dissents, one from then-Chief Justice Zimmerman and one from Justice Russon. Chief
Justice Zimmerman noted that the decision represented "a clear departure from the longstanding [plain meaning] rule," and expressed his opinion that this departure was unwise. Id.
at 270-71 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting). Justice Russon foreshadowed the exact criticisms
leveled by Mona in her brief, stating that the Ward majority "ignores well-settled precedent
in favor of an approach that invites parties to create ambiguity in even the clearest contract
provisions," and "upsets the expectations of contracting parties and litigation practices in
contract disputes," and could result in every single contract-based litigation proceeding to
trial rather than being decided on a motion. Id. at 270 (Russon, J., concurring in the result).
Despite these criticisms, expressed fully and eloquently by the Ward dissenters, the
Ward majority carried the day, and the rule announced in Ward is still good law. It has been
followed many times by both this Court as well as the Utah Supreme Court. See Peterson v.
Sunrider Corp.. 2002 UT 43, 1[19, 48 P.3d 918 (citing Ward, and stating that "[i]n
determining whether a contract is ambiguous the court is not bound to consider only the
language of the contract" and that "any relevant evidence must be considered"); Nielsen v.
Gold's Gvm. 2004 UT 37, \1, 78 P.3d 600 (citing Ward and Peterson); Gillmor v. Macev.
2005 UT App 351, TJ35 & n.14, 121 P.3d 57; Novell Inc. v. The Canopy Group. 2004 UT
App 162, f21,92 P.3d 768. Both Judge McConnell and Mona correctly point out that Utah's
appellate courts have, in several instances since Ward announced the new rule, cited in
720415vl
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passing to pre-Ward cases enunciating the old rule. See Flying J. 405 F.3d at 831. However,
these are merely passing references, and cannot be taken as authority that Ward did not mean
what it says.
The Utah Supreme Court has squarely addressed this issue, and has set forth careful
(albeit new) rules for courts to use in interpreting contracts. Unfortunately, the message of
Ward has not yet reached Mona or the district court, but the rule exists nonetheless. The rules
of contractual interpretation, as set forth by Appellants in their opening brief, are correct and
robust. The district court was required, under Ward and its progeny, to consider "any
relevant evidence" in making its threshold determination that the Settlement Agreement was
(or was not) ambiguous.
B,

Without Considering "Any Relevant Evidence," the District Court Made
the Determination—On a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion—That the Settlement
Agreement is Unambiguous

The district court did not follow these basic rules in this case. The district court
refused to consider "all relevant evidence" related to the intentions of the parties at the time
of contracting, and instead limited its review merely to the four corners of the document.
This alone was error.

The district court then compounded the error by making a

determination, without considering any of the proffered extrinsic evidence, that the
Settlement Agreement was unambiguous and could be construed in Mona's favor as a matter
of law.
Mona defends the district court's actions by arguing that Appellants, during the
Motion to Dismiss, "never presented extrinsic evidence to the trial court on the issue of
ambiguity." See Mona's Br., at 26. But this is not true. As Appellants have already noted
720415vl
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in their initial brief, during the hearing on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Appellants' counsel
noted, on the record, the presence of Mr. Dayle Jeffs ("Jeffs") in the courtroom during the
hearing, and informed the court that Jeffs was prepared to present testimony that he was
Clyde Lunceford's ("Clyde") personal attorney at the time, that he was retained by Clyde to
assist in drafting the Settlement Agreement at Clyde's instructions, and that Clyde had not
intended the Settlement Agreement to cut off Appellants' rights to the Trust. Appellants'
counsel also noted that Jeffs had written letters to counsel for both sides setting forth these
views, and counsel attempted to introduce those letters to the court. See R. at 484, p. 37.
Mona's counsel objected to the introduction of either the letters or Jeffs' testimony, on the
ground that extrinsic evidence was not admissible on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and the district
court sustained the objection and refused to allow introduction of the evidence. Id. Thus,
Mona is simply incorrect when she argues that Appellants did not ever try to introduce
extrinsic evidence supporting their interpretation of the Settlement Agreement.
Mona belittles these efforts, however, claiming that Appellants did not do enough to
bring the matter to the attention of the district court, because Appellants did not ever argue,
during the proceedings on the Motion to Dismiss, that the Settlement Agreement was
"ambiguous." See Mona's Br., at 26. Rather, Appellants' arguments below had been that
the Settlement Agreement unambiguously supported their interpretation. And that is the very
definition of ambiguity: "[a] contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation." See Peterson, 2002 UT 43, f 19,48 P.3d 918: see also Ward, 907
P.2d at 269 (same). If two parties are simultaneously arguing that a document can be
interpreted unambiguously in their favor, yet advance two very different interpretations, the
720415vl
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document is by definition ambiguous as long as both proffered interpretations are reasonable
and/or tenable. Appellants are aware of no authority requiring the parties to incant the magic
word "ambiguous" in order for this to be true. When presented with two apparently tenable
interpretations of the Settlement Agreement, the district court should have recognized that
the Settlement Agreement was ambiguous. The fact that neither Appellants nor Mona ever
argued, during the Rule 12(b)(6) proceedings, that the document was "ambiguous" is
irrelevant.
During the proceedings on the Motion to Reconsider, Appellants did argue that the
Settlement Agreement was "ambiguous," and pointed out to the district court that this was
so because both sides had advanced apparently tenable interpretations of the same document.
But this did not appear to matter to the district court, which denied the motion to reconsider
without even mentioning the Jeffs Affidavit or the "ambiguity" issue, because the court
continued to believe that the Settlement Agreement was "plain on its face." See R. at 398.
The district court erred by ruling, both on the initial Rule 12(b)(6) ruling and on the
ruling denying the motion to reconsider, that the Settlement Agreement was unambiguous
("plain on its face") and could be so interpreted without even considering relevant extrinsic
evidence.

In reality, case law obligated the district court to consider extrinsic

evidence—including the letters and Jeffs' testimony—before determining that the Settlement
Agreement was unambiguous. The district court's refusal to do so, based apparently upon
a misunderstanding of Utah law, is reversible error.
This error is especially evident in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. As the
district court itself stated, "the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion
720415vl
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to dismiss is proper if it clearly appears that a plaintiffcan prove no set of facts in support
of his or her claims." See R. at 185 (citing Coleman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622,
624 (Utah 1990)) (emphasis added); see also Mackev v. Cannon. 2000 UT App 36, | 9 , 996
P.2d 1081 (stating that a trial court's ruling dismissing a case under Rule 12(b)(6) "should
be affirmed only if it clearly appears [that] the complainant can prove no set of facts in
support of his or her claims"). By bringing to the court's attention Jeffs' letters and Jeffs'
potential testimony, Appellants were demonstrating to the court that there was in fact a set
of facts which, if proven, would support their claims. At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the district
court was obligated to allow Appellants the opportunity to conduct discovery and prove up
the set of facts made evident by Jeffs' testimony.
C.

The Jeffs Affidavit Is Admissible and Competent Evidence

Mona argues, however, that the Jeffs Affidavit is inadmissible in any event, because,
Mona claims, "a witness cannot speculate on the thought processes of another." See Mona's
Br., at 25 (citing Pepper v. State. 558 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)). Mona's
argument is simply not well taken. As Utah case law amply demonstrates, it is quite routine
in contested probate matters for an attorney, who formerly represented the deceased testator
or settlor, to offer testimony about what the testator or settlor intended a document to mean.
Such testimony is perfectly competent and admissible. Jeffs' affidavit is no different.
Utah's appellate courts have long held that "an attorney [is] permitted to testify in an
inquiry to ascertain, as between devisees under the client's will and a grantee claiming under
a deed from the client made after the will, as to what was intended by the deed." See Webb
v. Webb, 209 P.2d 201,204 (Utah 1949). Indeed, the court in Webb summed up the rule as
720415vl
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follows:

Thus where, after the death of the client, litigation arises between parties all of
whom claim under the client and the question to be determined is not the
existence of a right of action against the estate, but the intention of the
decedent as to creation of various rights which remain ambiguous, the attorney
may testify.
Id. This rule was more recently followed by the Utah Supreme Court. See Rentmeister v.
DeSilva, 553 P.2d 411 (Utah 1976). In Rentmeister, the question to be decided was whether
the settlor of a trust (now deceased) had intended that plaintiff receive $7,000 from the trust.
The trial court allowed the settlor's attorney, who had drafted the trust documents, to testify
at length about what the settlor intended, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
In short, there is a long tradition of allowing attorneys for deceased settlors and
devisors to testify in court, in contested probate matters, regarding what the deceased settlor
or devisor intended. Jeffs' testimony is no different from the testimony allowed in Webb and
Rentmeister.

Jeffs was Clyde's personal attorney, and participated in numerous

conversations with Clyde during the last years of his life during which Clyde confided in
Jeffs regarding his intentions for the Trust. Jeffs was one of the two principal draftsmen of
the Settlement Agreement, and consulted with Clyde about what that document ought to say,
and had conversations with Clyde immediately after the drafting and signing of the
Settlement Agreement in which Clyde told Jeffs that he still considered Appellants the
residual beneficiaries of the Trust. See R. at 281-83. Jeffs' testimony on these points is
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highly relevant and probative, and is perfectly competent and admissible.1
D.

The District Court's Determination that the Settlement Agreement Is
Unambiguous in Mona's Favor Was Erroneous

The district court's first error was refusing to consider Mr. Jeffs' testimony—clearly
"relevant evidence"—in making its determination that the Settlement Agreement is
unambiguous, as mandated by Ward and its progeny. The district court's second error was
its actual determination that the Settlement Agreement is unambiguous in Mona's favor.
When the entire document is examined, along with the parties' and Mr. Jeffs' respective
interpretations, it becomes clear that the Settlement Agreement is, at a minimum, ambiguous,
and cannot be interpreted as a matter of law in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

1

Mona also spends a great deal of time arguing that this Court cannot consider the Jeffs
Affidavit because Appellants attached it to the documents filed in support of the Motion to
Reconsider rather than to the documents filed in opposition to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
reasoning that Appellants should not get "a second chance to present the facts." See Mona's
Br., at 19-21. This argument may hold water in a summary judgment setting, where the
parties have a full and fair opportunity to develop the factual record through discovery prior
to litigating any motions for summary judgment. Indeed, every single one of the cases Mona
cites in support of her argument on this point is a summary judgment case. See id. (citing
cases). Mona does not, however, point this Court to a single authority holding that parties
are forbidden from introducing new evidence on a motion to reconsider in the context of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Appellants submit that this is because, in a Rule 12(b)(6) setting, the
parties have not even had a first chance (let alone a second) to develop a factual record
through discovery. By making Jeffs available for testimony during the hearing on the Rule
12(b)(6) motion, and by submitting the Jeffs Affidavit, all that Appellants have done is to
point out to the trial court that there is a set of facts that, if proven, would support their
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, and that therefore dismissal is improper under
Rule 12(b)(6). Mona's authorities are not to the contrary, and do not prevent this Court from
considering Jeffs' testimony.
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1.

Even without consideration of the Jeffs Affidavit, Appellants'
interpretation is tenable and reasonable, while Mona's proffered
interpretation is not.

Even without taking Jeffs' testimony into account, Appellants' proffered interpretation
is tenable and reasonable. Appellants pointed out to the district court that the phrases relied
upon by Mona were intended to refer to an entirely separate claim by Appellants to the
California Condominium and the Utah County Property—a claim, arising from a separate
dispute with Clyde, that Appellants (rather than the Trust) had present fee simple entitlement
to the property—and were not intended to refer to any rights Appellants may have had, or
may have in the future, to inherit a remainder interest in the property through the Trust. This
interpretation squares with Paragraph 4 of the Settlement Agreement, which states that
Appellants will deliver a quit-claim deed to the Trust, and with Paragraph 5 of the Settlement
Agreement, which explicitly reserves Clyde's right to use the Trust to bequeath any property
to any person. When the language of the entire Settlement Agreement is examined together,
it is clear that the intent of the parties was to have Appellants waive the other claims they had
to the California Condominium and the Utah County Property, but not any rights they may
have in the future to that same property through the Trust.
Mona, for her part, focuses on isolated phrases in the Settlement Agreement to support
her interpretation, and ignores several important provisions at odds with her interpretation
(Paragraph 5, for instance, which expressly reserves Clyde's right to use the Trust to bequeath
any property to any person, including Appellants). Mona relies heavily on the provision
stating that Appellants waived "entitlement to present or immediate testamentary interests
in the Coronado Condominium and the Clyde Residence," focusing largely on the word
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"testamentary."

See Mona's Br., at 29 (emphasis added) (arguing that the only

"testamentary" interest Appellants had in the Trust assets was through the Trust). Mona
blithely ignores, however, the words that come immediately before the word
"testamentary"—"present and immediate." At the time of the Settlement Agreement,
Appellants' interest in the Trust corpus through the Trust was hardly "present and
immediate"; indeed, the Trust was revocable and Clyde (as affirmed by Paragraph 5) retained
the right to change it at any time. Moreover, Appellants' interest was a remainder interest,
to begin only after Mona had enjoyed her life estate. A remainder interest in revocable trust
assets is hardly a "present and immediate" interest in anything. Accordingly, and as the
"present and immediate" language indicates, Appellants intended to waive other more
"present and immediate" claims to the Trust assets, not their claim through the Trust, which
would ripen, if at all, at some indeterminate time in the future.
In addition, the Settlement Agreement expressly recites, in the recitals, that Appellants
are beneficiaries of the Trust. See R. at 084 (reciting that "[a]s of the date of execution of
this Agreement, the Trustee [Jeffs] continues to serve as trustee of the Trust and the Trust
beneficiaries are as stated in the Trust, as amended"). By signing the Settlement Agreement
in January 2002, Mona agreed with that recital at the time. Yet later, and only after Clyde's
death, Mona came forward with suspicious-looking documents allegedly signed by Clyde in
2001 before the Settlement Agreement was executed that purport to eliminate Appellants'
interest in the Trust. If Clyde had really agreed with Mona to give the entire Trust corpus to
her and had signed the three 2001 documents so amending the Trust, that 2002 recital would
have been incorrect and fraudulent. On the other hand, the existence of the recital confirms
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Appellants' interpretation: that Appellants were still remainder beneficiaries under the Trust,
and the Trust had not been amended to remove them.2 Thus, though the Settlement
Agreement affirmatively states who the beneficiaries of the Trust were at the time, Mona
claims that the Trust had actually been amended prior to that point, and, further, that the
Settlement Agreement precludes anyone (including Appellants) from challenging her claim.
Mona's interpretation is absurd, and does not square with the recitals.
Finally, Mona relies heavily on the Settlement Agreement's release language, which
Mona characterizes as "the most comprehensive general release ever drafted." See Mona's
Br., at 30. This is a mischaracterization. The release clause (Paragraph 9) released the
"Claims" and related causes of action—the "Claims" is a term defined elsewhere in the
Settlement Agreement, and is to include the specific claims set forth in Recital I (including
Appellants' claim of "present or immediate testamentary interests" in the Trust assets).
Mona's arguments are therefore circular: the parties to this case hotly dispute whether
Appellants' claims in this case are among the "Claims" waived in the Settlement Agreement,
and therefore the Release clause in the Settlement Agreement cannot be used as support for
Mona's particular side of that argument. If the Settlement Agreement, as a whole, was

2

Mona also argues that the Settlement Agreement was itself an implied amendment of
the Trust, see Mona's Br., at 31-32, even though it does not so state, and even though it
expressly left Clyde's right to tinker with the Trust unimpaired. Indeed, this portion of
Mona's brief seems to indicate an uncertainty, on the part of Mona herself, with respect to
how the Settlement Agreement can be reconciled with the continued existence of the Trust.
See id- (arguing that the Agreement amended the Trust, but putting forth varied arguments
regarding how and to what extent the Trust may have been amended). The reality is that the
Settlement Agreement did not amend the Trust in any way; Appellants' proffered
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement (as opposed to Mona's) can be fully squared with
the continued existence of the Trust.
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intended to cover the claims raised in this case, then they are waived; if the Settlement
Agreement, as a whole, was not so intended, then the claims are not waived.
Appearing to concede this, Mona next argues that the claims in this case are "related
to" or "arise out o f the "Claims" waived in the Settlement Agreement, and are therefore
released under Paragraph 9. See Mona's Br., at 30. This is absolutely false. This is the point
that neither Mona nor the district court can seem to understand: the "Claims" waived in the
Settlement Agreement had to do with long-simmering family disputes about the family LLC
and other issues. The issues raised in this case have to do with, inter alia, whether Mona
forged three documents purporting to grant her complete control over the Trust, and over
whether Appellants are still remainder beneficiaries of the Trust. The two sets of claims are
not related, and one does not arise out of the other.
In short, even if one were to restrict review of the Settlement Agreement to the four
corners of the document, the Agreement's actual terms are far more in line with Appellants'
interpretation than they are with Mona's. Appellants' interpretation is, at a minimum, tenable
and reasonable, and therefore the district court erred in construing the document against them
as a matter of law on a Rule 12 motion.
2.

Consideration of "all relevant evidence," including the Jeffs
Affidavit, cements Appellants' interpretation as the correct one.

When one expands the inquiry, as commanded by the Utah Supreme Court, beyond
the four comers of the document to "all relevant evidence," it becomes absolutely clear that
the Settlement Agreement is, at a minimum, ambiguous, and that Appellants' interpretation
is more than merely "tenable" or "reasonable." Indeed, it becomes clear that Appellants'
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interpretation should ultimately prevail as the correct one.
The Jeffs Affidavit is devastating to Mona. As soon as a court actually considers it,
Mona's entire position on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion will fall apart. Appellants suspect that
this is why Mona spends so much of her brief arguing that the Jeffs Affidavit is "prejudicial"
and should not be considered by either this Court or the trial court. If this case is remanded
for discovery, Jeffs will be deposed, and will testify, inter alia, about the conversations he
had with Clyde wherein Clyde still considered Appellants residual beneficiaries of the Trust,
even after execution of the Settlement Agreement. Jeffs will also testify about his grave
suspicions of Mona and the mysterious appearance, immediately after Clyde's death, of the
three 2001 documents. Jeffs will also testify that he had a large role in drafting the
Settlement Agreement upon Clyde's instructions, and that the parties to that Agreement did
not intend to amend the Trust or waive any of the claims that Appellants brought below.
In fact, this is a case that proves the wisdom of the rule announced in Ward. The
district court, using its own lens and its own preconceived notions of the meaning of words,
ruled that Appellants had waived their claims to Ihe Trust assets, and ruled that the document
was unambiguous on this point. However, despite the district court's apparent certainty
regarding the meaning of the document, the available extrinsic evidence clearly indicates that
the parties intended something different. If courts are truly to give effect and meaning to the
parties' intent—the supposed touchstone of contractual interpretation and enforcement—the
available evidence regarding that intent must be considered.
If the district court had considered Jeffs' testimony, it would have been impossible for
it to conclude that the Settlement Agreement was unambiguous in Mona's favor. In reality,
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Jeffs' affidavit establishes Appellants' interpretation as the correct one, or, at a bare
minimum, makes Appellants' interpretation "tenable" and "reasonable" for the purposes of
an ambiguity determination, and makes it impossible for the district court to construe the
Settlement Agreement in Mona's favor on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Thus, the district court's determination that the Settlement Agreement was
unambiguous, and could be interpreted as a matter of law in Mona's favor on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, was erroneous and should be reversed. At a minimum, the Settlement Agreement
is ambiguous, and therefore its interpretation must await discovery and testimony regarding
its meaning.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES TO
MONA
Finally, the district court should not have awarded attorneys' fees to Mona. The

district court's award of attorneys' fees was based on an erroneous ruling that the Settlement
Agreement could be unambiguously interpreted in Mona's favor on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
This ruling is wrong, and should be reversed for the reasons set forth above. Because Mona
should not have been the prevailing party on the motion, the district court's award of
attorneys' fees in Mona's favor should be reversed as well.
Mona contends, however, that even if the district court's decision is reversed, "Mona
would still be entitled to some attorney's fees," because "Appellants have brought many more
claims [in their Complaint] than they have chosen to defend in this appeal." See Mona's Br.,
at 34. This argument is misguided, for the reasons stated above, in part LB. The district
court did not rule on the merits of Appellants' individual affirmative claims (e.g., that Scott
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rather than Mona is the successor trustee, and that the three 2001 documents are not
authentic); rather, the court simply ruled that all of Appellants' individual affirmative claims
were waived under the "unambiguous" terms of the Settlement Agreement. Appellants
cannot appeal issues not decided below, and therefore did not burden the appellate record
with such issues. This does not and cannot result in a waiver. If the district court's decision
is reversed, Appellants' entire Complaint will be reinstated, and Appellants will be free to
argue and prove their claims as pleaded. No final judgment will, in that instance, have been
rendered in favor of anyone, and Mona will have no entitlement to attorneys' fees on any
issue.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's orders granting Mona's Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, as well as the order denying Appellants' Motion to Reconsider,
should be reversed, and the attendant order granting Mona attorneys' fees and costs should
also be reversed. This case should be remanded for further proceedings, including discovery
as to the intent and meaning of the Settlement Agreement, and trial.
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